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Abstract  
 
We present a simple model explaining corruption on geography and climate conditions. 
We test the model’s validity in a cross-section of 115 countries. Controlling for all other 
corruption’s determinants we find evidence supporting the model’s predictions. 
Corruption increases with temperature and declines with precipitation and non-
cultivatable land. Corruption also declines with per capita GDP, democracy, median age 
and British colonial heritage; and increases with natural resources, bureaucracy and 
communist past. Finally, corruption declines with the ratio of internet users to total 
population. This new finding is interpreted as capturing the beneficial interaction of 
economic development, human capital/education and independent news. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Recent years have seen a surge of economic research on corruption. Interest on 
this topic is well-justified, as corruption is thought to cause significant economic and 
social costs including lower income levels and growth, higher income inequality and 
increased distortions in the economy’s public and private sector.
1
 The costs of 
corruption are one of two branches in this fast-expanding literature. The second, on 
which this paper focuses, is corruption’s causes. Previous research, reviewed in section 
2 below, conditions corruption on a variety of economic, political and social/cultural 
variables. One variable which is conspicuously absent is geographical and climate 
conditions (GCCs).
2
 This omission is rather surprising given that GCCs are fundamental 
exogenous factors affecting all human activities and have been used to explain other 
important economic variables such as economic growth (see e.g. Mauro 1995, Sachs 
2001 and Dell et al, 2009).  
This paper offers a new, rational economic explanation of corruption based on 
GCCs. Our analysis relies on a central assumption going back to Adam Smith’s (1759) 
Theory of Moral Sentiments supported by significant volume of modern experimental 
evidence (see Camerer and Fehr, 2006). This is that people subscribe to generally 
accepted norms of fairness, classify the actions of others on a generally accepted 
fairness scale, and are prepared to extend altruistic rewards/punishments to those 
abiding/not-abiding to the commonly-accepted fairness norms. Furthermore, fairness 
norms do not differ significantly across societies, as suggested by world-wide 
                                                 
1
 The main channels through which corruption is associated with these negative outcomes include 
misallocation of public funds; public investment of lower quality/productivity; inefficient regulation, 
lower volumes of private investment, foreign direct investment and international trade; increased cost of 
servicing public debt; reduced valuation of equities, sub-optimal formation of human capital; increased 
shadow economy, tax avoidance and a tax system placing disproportionately high weights on indirect 
taxes and seignorage revenue. For a detailed survey see Lambsdorff, (2006).   
2
 Geography is occasionally mentioned as a determinant of corruption on the basis of natural resources 
availability, proximity to major trading centres and corruption among neighbouring countries. As 
explained below, however, these factors are essentially economic determinants of corruption; they do not 
explain corruption on the effects of geography in human behaviour per se.  
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repetitions of experiments such as the “ultimatum” game and evidence of considerable 
agreement across cultures with respect to what constitutes corrupt behaviour (see 
Camerer and Fehr, 2006, Azfar et al, 2001).  
In our analysis corruption is defined as an extreme form of individualism, which 
is in turn defined as actions of self-rewarding agents aiming exclusively towards 
improvement of their own personal welfare. We consider individualism to constitute 
acceptable social behaviour as long as self-improvement is pursued through means 
complying with the generally accepted fairness norms. We assume that compliance with 
the fairness norms requires a minimum of civic engagement, reflected in the share of 
one’s personal resources dedicated to the pursuit of wholly or partially collective rather 
than exclusively self-rewarding objectives. As a result, in our analysis the generally 
accepted scale of fairness coincides with a scale of individualism measuring the share of 
one’s resources dedicated to pursuing strictly self-rewarding objectives. This renders 
corruption, defined as actions not complying with the common fairness norms, a form 
of extreme individualism, i.e. a state where the share of one’s personal resources 
dedicated to strictly self-rewarding actions exceeds a critical threshold up to which 
individualism is regarded to be legitimate. With heterogeneous agents, each person’s 
degree of individualism is a random variable following a certain (e.g. normal) 
probability distribution. Given people’s inherent sense of fairness, we assume that this 
distribution’s mean (µ) is always below corruption’s threshold (k), i.e. the representative 
agent acts fairly in all societies (see Figure 1). The average level of individualism, 
however, may vary across societies. All else equal, a society with a relatively high 
average level of individualism (µΙ) will exhibit a higher frequency of extreme 
individualism, i.e. more observations in the range of corruption, compared to a co-
operative society presenting a relatively low average value of individualism (µC,  see 
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Figure 2). In that case, the factors explaining the frequency of extreme observations, 
reflecting the aggregate level of corruption, will be the same factors determining the 
mean of the distribution of individualism.  
This brings us to the central point of our paper: We argue that the average level 
of individualism, and hence the aggregate level of corruption, are determined by rational 
incentives created by an exogenous fundamental factor, namely GCCs. To show this, 
we use a simple model of utility maximization where the representative agent derives 
utility from consumption and leisure. Output, which in our model equals consumption, 
is determined by labour effort and labour productivity. The representative agent 
operates under a survival constraint imposing a minimum, for survival, level of 
consumption. To meet this constraint the agent can either work individually or in co-
operation with another agent. The productivity of individual labour is exogenously 
determined by stochastic GCCs. In making her choice, the agent faces a trade-off. Co-
operative work increases labour productivity beyond the level determined by GCCs due 
to positive synergies. From that point of view, the agent has an incentive to work co-
operatively. On the other hand, the disutility of co-operative labour is higher than that of 
individual labour, due to co-ordination costs present in joint work. From that point of 
view, the agent has an incentive to work individually. As favourable GCCs increase the 
productivity of individual labour, the latter can meet the survival constraint easier under 
favourable rather than unfavourable GCCs. Therefore, more favourable GCCs provide 
incentives for more individual work, resulting in a higher level of average individualism 
and higher aggregate corruption. To the best of our knowledge our paper is the first in 
the economic literature to use GCCs as a structural determinant of corruption. The 
insight, on which it is based, however, is not new. Indeed, the link between 
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individualism and GCCs exists in the very first piece of written history, the works of 
Herodotus.
3
 
Our explanation of corruption seems, at first sight, more relevant to ancient-rural 
rather than modern-industrial economies. Is it possible that corruption is such a long-
memory process for its level in the very old past to bear a present-day legacy? The 
answer is, possibly yes. Experimental evidence discussed by Camerer and Fehr (2006) 
suggests that as the ratio of excessively individualistic agents to total population 
increases, the ability of fair agents to impose outcomes consistent with the generally 
accepted fairness norms declines, inducing them to adopt non-fair behaviour. Therefore, 
a critical mass of excessively individualistic agents may have an amplifying effect on 
corruption as it increases the average value of observed individualism beyond the level 
consistent with the preferences of the representative agent. Thus, GCCs may have 
determined in the very long past an initial equilibrium of high corruption from which 
                                                 
3
 Writing in the fifth century B.C., in Book Two of his Histories (Euterpe), Herodotus, comparing ancient 
Egypt with ancient Greece mentions: “When the Egyptians…who live in the Delta [of the Nile]…found 
out that the whole of Greece relies on rainfall rather than its rivers, as Egypt does, to irrigate the land, 
they commented that the Greeks would one day have their high hopes dashed and would suffer the 
torments of starvation. What they were getting at was that if the God decides not to rain and maintains a 
state of drought instead, the Greeks will die of hunger, because Zeus is their only source of water…At the 
moment, of course, they [the Egyptians living in Delta of the Nile] gather their crops with less effort than 
anyone else in the world, including the rest of Egypt. They do not work at breaking the land up into 
furrows with a plough, they do not have to wield hoes or carry out any of the other crop-farming tasks 
which everyone else does. Instead, the river rises of its own accord and irrigates the fields, and when the 
water has receded again, each of them sows seed in his own field and sends pigs into it to tread the seed 
down. Once this has been done, he only has to wait for the harvest-time, and then he has his pigs thresh 
the grain. And that is how he brings in his crops”. He continues: “I was particularly eager to find out why 
the Nile starts coming down in a flood at the summer solstice…but remains low for the whole 
winter…My desire to know about these matters led me to make enquiries”.  He proceeds to discuss three 
theories regarding the flow of the Nile advocated by Greek thinkers of the time, all of which were based 
on climate conditions. Having dismissed all three as implausible, he offers his own explanation also based 
on climate conditions involving the position of sun, rain, moisture and winds. To summarize, Herodotus 
describes what a modern economist would view as different steady-state allocations, with differences 
between ancient Greece and Egypt defined in terms of starvation and labour effort (concepts that relate 
directly to the arguments of a modern utility function, i.e. consumption and leisure respectively) as well 
as individualism, with Herodotus indicating that production in Egypt is organised on more individualistic 
lines than in Greece. Notice that the precise choice of words in the ancient Greek text for the phrase “each 
of them...in his own field” (ἕκαστος τὴν ἑωυτοῦ ἄρουραν) is such as to emphasise the element of 
individuality involved in the activities described. Herodotus finds these differences important enough to 
merit detailed inquiries, after which he comes up with explanations based on climate conditions. What he 
argues, in effect, is that favourable GCCs increase land productivity causing a more individualistic 
structure of production in Egypt relative to Greece. Therefore, Herodotus was the first to imply that 
geography and climate are structural variables explaining individualism and, by extension, corruption.  
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society cannot depart without developing credible/effective mechanisms of imposing 
fair behaviour. The more a society remains in this initial equilibrium the more difficult 
it becomes to develop such mechanisms, as culture adapts to corruption’s presence and 
the costs for individuals willing to adopt fair behaviour increases. Corruption may then 
display very long-run memory. Exactly how long is an empirical question. If GCCs are 
statistically significant in explaining corruption after all other possible determinants are 
included in the analysis, then the answer is very long indeed.  
This is precisely the empirical approach followed in this paper. We test the link 
between corruption and GGCs using data from a cross-section of 115 countries. 
Following the majority of existing studies, we measure corruption using the Corruption 
Perception Index published by Transparency International (TI-CPI) and, for robustness, 
the Control of Corruption Index compiled by the World Bank (WB-CCI). Controlling 
for all other possible determinants of corruption suggested in the literature, we find that 
corruption is indeed endogenous to GCCs. In particular, corruption increases with 
temperature and declines with precipitation and the ratio of non-cultivatable land to total 
area. We also find that corruption declines with per capita GDP and genuine, as opposed 
to “half-hearted”, democracy, and median age; and increases with natural resources and 
bureaucracy/regulation. British colonial heritage reduces corruption whereas a 
communist past increases it. Finally, we find that corruption declines with the ratio of 
internet users to a country’s population. This new finding, not reported in previous 
literature, is intuitively plausible as it is interpreted to capture the beneficial interaction 
of economic development, education and independent news/information.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
literature on the causes of corruption. Section 3 presents a simple theoretical model 
 7 
explaining corruption on GCCs. Section 4 presents our empirical analysis. Finally, 
section 5 summarises and offers concluding remarks.  
 
2. THE CAUSES OF CORRUPTION: A BRIEF REVIEW  
Research on the causes of corruption is inter-disciplinary with economics, 
politics and sociology all making significant contributions. Before reviewing them, two 
generic issues relating to their empirical testing must be noted. The first is the scarcity 
of data on actual levels of corruption. As a result, most empirical studies are based on 
indexes of perceived corruption, compiled using surveys of residents’ and foreign 
experts’ subjective assessments. Unavoidably this raises a question of measurement 
errors. Reassuringly, however, indexes compiled by different organisations are highly 
correlated, as are those using the views of local and foreign residents. This increases the 
credibility of perception indexes as valid approximations of actual corruption.  
The second issue refers to endogeneity. Many causes of corruption are 
themselves caused by corruption and are highly correlated between them. Theoretically, 
this problem can be addressed using valid instruments. In practise, however, it is almost 
impossible to find variables correlated with corruption’s determinants but not correlated 
with corruption or among them. As a result, modelling corruption on variables 
potentially determined by corruption carries the risk of endogeneity bias. On the other 
hand, excluding such variables could result in omitted variables’ bias. With the 
literature’s emphasis being on qualitative rather than quantitative inference, the former 
is generally regarded as a risk preferable to the latter; in which case positive findings are 
regarded as more robust than negative ones (see Treisman, 2000).   
 
 
 8 
2.1. Economic determinants of corruption  
Economic determinants of corruption fall into two categories: economic 
development and rent-seeking opportunities available to government officials. Starting 
with the former, the link between economic development and corruption is clearly a 
two-way one as corruption is unambiguously regarded to be detrimental to growth (see 
Mauro, 1995). But income levels also affects corruption, as richer countries can afford 
good-quality institutions; higher officials’ wages tilting their cost-benefit analysis 
against corruption; and a better education system reducing tolerance against corruption 
(see Treisman, 2000 and Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000). Empirical studies have 
consistently shown per-capita GDP to be the variable most strongly associated with 
corruption. As such, it is the control variable against which all other possible causes of 
corruption are typically tested.  
Rent-seeking opportunities are linked to corruption through a number of 
channels. The first is government intervention in economic life. Empirical evidence, 
however, on this link’s strength is rather mixed. La Palompara (1994) and Gerring and 
Thacker (2005) do not find a significant association while Elliot (1997), Treisman 
(2000) and Montinola and Jackman (2002) do so.
4
 The evidence is more robust on the 
role of regulation, bureaucracy and competition. Broadman and Recanatini (1999), 
Djankov et al (2002) and Svensson (2005) find that excessive regulation placing 
barriers to market entry lead to higher corruption, while Gerring and Thacker (2005) 
find that good-quality regulation is associated with lower corruption. Goldsmith (1999) 
and Paldam (2002) emphasise openness in public procurements, arguing that higher 
competition drives prices down reducing the scope for rent-seeking behaviour. Ades 
and Di Tella (1997, 1999) support this view, also finding that economic openness has a 
                                                 
4
 An argument reconciling these conflicting findings has been provided by La Porta et al (1999) who have 
argued that particular government sector activities (e.g. redistributive activities) may be more vulnerable 
to corruption than others (e.g. education). 
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negative effect on corruption. Treisman (2000) present similar findings, corroborated by 
Sachs and Werner (1995), Leite and Weidmann (1999) and Wei (2000).
5
 Finally, 
corruption is linked to the availability of natural resources, whose profitable 
exploitation creates rent-seeking opportunities (see Leite and Weidmann (1999), Ades 
and Di Tella (1999), Gylfason (2001) and Montinola and Jackman (2002)).  
 
2.1. Political determinants of corruption   
Political determinants of corruption can broadly be classified in three categories: 
exposure to democracy; constitutional arrangements; and colonial/legal heritage. 
Democracy is thought to reduce corruption by protecting individuals from officials’ 
abuses and club-practices. Furthermore, as elections promote competition for political 
mandates, democracy increases corruption’s price for politicians and their appointees. A 
similar argument is provided by Brunetti and Weder (2003) who suggest that by 
increasing scrutiny on individuals in positions of power, free access to independent 
news reduces corruption. Empirical studies including Chowdhury (2004) and Bohara et 
al (2004)) find exposure to democracy to be negatively associated with corruption. On 
the other hand, Goldsmith (1999), Treisman (2000), Paldam (2001) and Persson et al 
(2003) find that once other variables are controlled for, this relation breaks down. 
Treisman (2000) and Gerring and Thacker (2004, 2005) find that rather than current 
exposure to democracy, corruption is explained by democratic tradition. Reconciling the 
above, Montinola and Jackman (2002) argue that moderate levels of democracy do not 
reduce corruption, they may even increase it; but when a critical threshold of democratic 
freedoms is reached, corruption indeed declines. Sung (2004) supports this view: He 
                                                 
5
 Wei (2000) divides openness into a natural component, determined by population and remoteness from 
world’s financial centres, and a residual component, explained by policy regime and trade policy. He 
finds that corruption declines with natural openness but does not depend on residual openness. Similar 
findings are reported by Ades and Di Tella (1999).  
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finds the best empirical specification for the relationship between corruption and 
democracy to be non-linear, with measures of democracy entering in the third power.  
Constitutional determinants of corruption include parliament’s power versus the 
executive, decentralisation/federalism, and electoral laws/voting systems. Panizza 
(2001), Lederman et al (2001) and Gerring and Thacker (2004) suggest that by limiting 
the executive’s scope for rent-seeking behaviour, powerful parliaments reduce 
corruption. The link between corruption and decentralisation is disputed. Fisman and 
Gatti (2002) argue that by facilitating the monitoring of politicians at the local level, 
decentralisation reduces corruption. They also report positive correlation between 
corruption and a country’s population, which they interpret as further evidence that 
smaller units of government reduce corruption (see also Damania et al, 2004). The 
alternative view is that local governments are weaker and therefore more corruption-
prone than central ones. This is particularly relevant for countries where the federal 
structure reflects ethnological/linguistic fragmentation leading to multiple affiliations 
and mixed loyalties. Furthermore, ethnically divided societies tend to under-provide 
public goods, causing increased incentives for corruption (see, Mauro 1995 and Alesina 
et al, 2003). All in all, empirical evidence on the link between decentralisation and 
corruption is mixed, with results largely determined by sample selection and 
decentralisation’s measurement.  
A similar ambiguity applies to the role of electoral laws and voting systems. 
Persson et al (2003) argue that smaller voting districts increase corruption by restricting 
entry to new candidates and reducing political competition. They also find that 
corruption is higher in countries whose parliaments are elected from set party-lists 
rather than individually-elected candidates. As the second effect is found to be stronger 
than the first, their analysis implies that voting systems with proportional representation, 
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even in large districts, result into higher corruption than systems based on majority rule. 
Further support to this conclusion is provided by Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman (2005). 
By contrast Panizza (2001) suggests that the effect of electoral laws is particular to each 
country, depending on the extent to which controls on political parties are undermined 
by excessive influence of individual politicians.  
Finally, corruption has been linked to the legal heritage of a country’s colonial 
past. Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) argue that legal systems based on British-based 
common law are better-equipped to tackle corruption than those based on code law for 
three reasons. First, common law is historically rooted to the British aristocracy’s effort 
to protect their property rights against abuses on behalf of the Crown. As such, it offers 
better protection to individuals against officials’ coercion and power abuse. Second, 
common law systems provide the judiciary with higher independence, which reduces 
corruption (see La Porta et al, 1999). This is in contrast with other legal traditions, such 
as communist ones, where lack of judicial independence promotes corruption (see 
Gerring and Thacker, 2005). Finally, by emphasising the procedural aspects of applying 
the law, the British law system enhances the ability of subordinates and judges to 
challenge judicial hierarchies and politicians. Among others, Treisman (2000) and 
Swamy et al (2001) provides empirical evidence that ex-British colonies present lower 
corruption than colonies of other countries or countries that have never been colonised.  
 
3.1. Social and cultural determinants of corruption  
The third set of corruption’s determinants refers to social and cultural factors, 
the main of which are trust, values, religion, acceptance of hierarchies and gender. Trust 
among society’s members reduces corruption by allowing bureaucrats to co-operate 
better with each other and private citizens. Evidence supporting this hypothesis has been 
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provided by La Porta et al (1997), Adsera et al (2000), Uslaner (2004) and Bjornskov 
and Paldam (2004).
6
 Values affect corruption through multiple channels. Husted (1999) 
provides evidence suggesting that corruption increases with the extent to which the 
quest for material success dominates over concerns for quality of life; and the extent to 
which society members feel threatened by uncertainty. Sandholtz and Taagepera (2005) 
emphasize the role of “traditionalism”: They find societies cultivating values of secular-
rational-impersonal attitudes to be less corrupt than societies dominated by traditional, 
religious and family values. Similar findings are reported by Lipset and Lenz (2000) 
who construct a scale of “familism” and find it to be significant in explaining 
corruption, even after controlling for per capita income.  
Religion features in many studies modelling corruption, as it is considered 
important for the creation or prevention of hierarchical structures that restrict civic 
engagement and promote corruption (see Treisman, 2000). In particular, with protestant 
creeds being less hierarchical and more independent from the state, protestant societies 
are often assumed to be less tolerant to corruption. Authors, including La Porta et al 
(1997, 1999), Treisman (2000), Lipset and Lenz (2000), Gerring and Thacker (2005) 
and Paldam (2001) provide empirical evidence supporting this view. The detrimental 
effects of hierarchy have also been studied by Husted (1999) in a non-religious context. 
He models corruption on a variable defined as “power distance” measuring the extent to 
which the less powerful members of institutions and organisations expect and accept 
that power is distributed unequally. He finds this variable to be statistically significant 
in explaining corruption, and robust to the inclusion of other variables.  
                                                 
6
 Anderson and Tverdova (2003) focus on another type of trust, namely the one among corruption 
partners. They argue that this is critical for corruption’s persistence, as corrupt deals cannot be legally 
enforced. Corruption is indeed found to be higher in countries where partners are confident that 
corruption deals will be honoured and favours will be reciprocated. Lambsdorff (2002) supports this 
view. An interesting insight drawn from this research is that to fight corruption effectively it is important 
to destroy trust among corruption’s partners.  
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Finally, another suggested determinant of corruption is gender, with females 
assumed to be less prone to corruption. Swamy et al (2001), Dollar et al (2001) and 
Sung and Chu (2003) provide evidence showing that increased female participation in 
labour force and parliament is associated with lower corruption. This finding, however, 
is subject to the critique of reverse causality, as low levels of corruption may place 
restrictions in male-dominated networks, resulting in higher participation of females. 
Furthermore, female participation in the labour market or political competition may be a 
proxy for other variables, such as democracy and the rule of law, protecting women’s 
rights and promoting meritocracy.   
 
3. A SIMPLE MODEL OF INDIVIDUALISM AND CORRUPTION BASED ON 
GEOGRAPHY AND CLIMATE CONDITIONS  
Consider an economy of identical agents deriving utility from consuming a 
composite good and disutility from labour effort, which is the only production factor. 
The representative agent’s utility function is given by:  
U = ln C  - κ l               (1) 
where C denotes consumption, l hours worked and κ >0.   
Assume that the composite good can be produced in two ways, either by 
individual or co-operative labour. Total labour effort is the sum of the two: 
21
lll +=                (2) 
where the subscripts 1 and 2 respectively refer to individual and co-operative variables. 
Assume now that the disutility of labour is not homogeneous across types of labour. Co-
operative labour involves a co-ordination cost which, all else equal, reduces leisure and 
welfare. In that case, the agent’s utility function becomes:  
U = ln C  - κ1 1l - κ2 2l                                    (3) 
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where 
12
κκ f   
Co-operative labour is more productive than individual labour due to synergies 
accruing from co-operation. This results in separate individual and co-operative 
production functions, respectively described by (4) and (5) below:  
Y1 = A1 
a
1
l                 (4) 
 Y2 = A2 
a
2
l                  (5) 
In equations (4) and (5) 0<a<1, implying declining marginal product of labour, 
and A1 and A2 are exogenous productivity parameters with A2> A1 > 0.  
Assuming that all output is consumed, the sum of an agent’s individual and co-
operative production equals the agent’s total consumption, i.e.  
C = Y1 + Y2 = A1 
a
1
l + A2 
a
2
l              (6) 
Replacing equation (6) in (3) the representative agent’s utility function becomes:  
U = ln (A1 
a
1
l + A2 
a
2
l )  - κ1 1l - κ2 2l            (7) 
Finally, assume that the representative agent operates under a survival constraint 
imposing a minimum level of consumption M:  
C = Y1 + Y2 = A1 
a
1
l + A2 
a
2
l ≥  M             (8) 
The agent maximizes the utility function given by equation (7) with respect to 
1l
and 
2l
subject to the survival constraint given in equation (8). Taking first order 
conditions and solving the resulting system of equations yields the following ratio of 
individual to co-operative labour:  






−






==
1
1
12
21
2
1
a
A
A
R
κ
κ
l
l
                                    (9) 
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From equation (9) we obtain 0
1
f
A
R
∂
∂
, 0
2
f
κ∂
∂R
, 0
2
p
A
R
∂
∂
and 0
2
p
κ∂
∂R
, i.e. the ratio of 
individual to co-operative labour (R) increases with the productivity of individual labour 
(A1) and disutility of co-operative labour (κ2); and declines with the productivity of co-
operative labour (A2) and disutility of individual labour (κ1).7, 8 
Equation (9) provides a measure of individualism consistent with our definition 
in the introduction section, i.e. share of personal resources dedicated to pursuing 
exclusively self-rewarding objectives. Assume now that the productivity of individual 
labour A1 is determined by exogenous GCCs. Agents working under favourable GCCs, 
implying a high value for A1, will display a relatively high level of individualism, as 
high-productivity individual work can meet easier the survival constraint allowing a 
larger amount of leisure.
9
 By contrast, agents working under unfavourable GCCs, 
implying a low value for A1, will have strong incentives to use the synergies present in 
co-operative labour to meet the survival constraint. Overall, equation (9) suggests that 
the more favourable a country’s GCCs are, the higher is the level of the representative 
agent’s individualism. Introducing stochastic heterogeneity across agents gives rise to a 
                                                 
7
 It is also easy to show that individual and co-operative labour both increase with the amount of 
minimum consumption M. 
8
 These results continue to hold if A2 becomes endogenous to A1 under the plausible assumption that 
shocks to individual labour productivity have incomplete pass-through to co-operative labour 
productivity. To show this, assume the former having a mark-up over the latter given by A2 = A1 [1+ f(A1)] 
where f(A1)≥ 0 (i.e. negative synergies cannot occur). Replacing this formula in (9) we obtain:  
( )
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Differentiating with respect to A1 we can easily show that as long as the mark-up of co-operative over 
individual labour declines with increases in individual productivity, positive shocks in the latter give rise 
to a higher value for the ratio of individual to co-operative work. In short, if ( ) 0/
1
pdAdf then 
0)/(
1
fAR ∂∂ .  
9
 This assumption is intuitively plausible, as any given amount of individual labour would be expected to 
yield a higher level of output under abundant fertile land and temperate climate (e.g. ancient 
Mediterranean) rather than sparse cultivatable land and extreme weather conditions (e.g. ancient 
Scandinavia). If that is so we might view, at least up to a certain extent, the North-to-South immigration 
waves occurring in ancient Europe as an “arbitrage” phenomenon, with Northern Europeans moving from 
GCCs of low marginal labour productivity to GCCs of higher marginal labour productivity in the South.  
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certain (e.g. normal) distribution of individualism whose mean equals the representative 
agent’s score (Figure 1). In that case, if corruption is defined as extreme individualism, 
going beyond a universally accepted critical threshold of legitimate individualism, the 
aggregate level of corruption will be given by the frequency of observations falling 
beyond corruption’s critical threshold (Figure 1). Therefore, more favourable GCCs 
causing a higher average level of individualism will also cause a higher level of 
corruption (Figure 2). We proceed to test this hypothesis in section 4 below.  
 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS  
4.1. Data  
We use data from a cross-section of 115 countries listed in Table A1 in the 
Appendix.
10
 We measure corruption using the three-year average of the Corruption 
Perception Index published by Transparency International (TI-CPI) for years 2007, 
2008 and 2009 and the Control of Corruption Index published by the World Bank (WB-
CCI) for years 2006, 2007 and 2008. Using averages has the advantage of mitigating the 
effects of random measurement errors particular to specific years. We explain 
corruption on four sets of variables, namely GCCs, and the three variables suggested by 
previous literature as possible determinants of corruption, i.e. economic, political and 
social/cultural variables. An important characteristic relating to GCCs is that the issue 
of endogeneity does not arise: Although GCCs variables may be endogenous to each 
other, as a group they are clearly exogenous to every other possible determinant of 
corruption. In other words, if any endogeneity exists, causation is clearly running from 
the set of GCCs to other variables. Endogeneity may exist among some of the remaining 
determinants of corruption. However, as discussed in section 2, with the possible 
                                                 
10
 With the exception of South Africa, we exclude all sub-Saharan African countries. We do so to ensure 
that the particularly unfavourable economic/political circumstances prevailing in many of those countries 
(see Sachs, 2001) do not bias our findings in favour of a significant effect of GCCs on corruption.  
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exception of GDP it is impossible to find valid instruments approximating the affected 
variables. Therefore, the findings reported below are better seen in the light of 
Treisman’s (2000) remarks suggesting that positive empirical findings are more robust 
than negative ones. 
The full data definitions and sources are reported in Table A2 in the Appendix. 
We measure climate conditions using average daily sunlight hours, annual average 
temperature in Celsius degrees, average volume of daily precipitation, annual average 
number of wet days and average number of days with temperature below freezing point 
(zero Celsius degrees).
11
 Geographical conditions are approximated using total length of 
coastline (kilometres), maximum elevation point (metres), total country area (squared 
kilometres), percentage of inland water bodies (rivers, lakes, etc.) in total country area 
and percentage of non-cultivatable land in total country area. Economic variables 
include level of per capita (PPP-adjusted) GDP measured in 2007 US Dollars, the ratio 
of government spending to GDP, economic openness, the Ease of Doing Business Index 
published by doingbusiness.org as a proxy for bureaucracy/regulation; and natural 
resources’ availability, approximated by volume of proven oil and natural gas reserves. 
Education spending, used as a proxy for human capital, is calculated as percent in GDP. 
Political variables include the Political Rights Index published by the Freedom House, 
as a proxy for the current level of democracy; a dummy variable taking the value of 
unity for countries with uninterrupted democracy since 1950, as a proxy for long-
standing democratic tradition; the Freedom of Press Index published by the Freedom 
House, measuring restrictions on press; the ratio of internet users to total population, as 
a proxy for access to independent news and its interaction with economic development 
and quality of education; the Political Globalisation Index published by the Swiss 
                                                 
11
 The values of a country’s climate variables are approximated by their values in the country’s capital 
city as reported by the BBC weather site. For some countries BBC weather does not report climate 
conditions for the capital city, in which case we use values reported for the country’s largest city. 
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Economic Institute (KOF), as a proxy for a country’s integration to the international 
community; a dummy variable taking the value of unity for constitutionally federal 
states; total population as a proxy for the degree of federalism; a dummy variable taking 
the value of unity for countries applying common law legal systems; and a set of 
dummies taking the value of unity for different types of colonial/imperial/communist 
past. Finally, social/cultural variables include urbanisation; income inequality measured 
by the Gini coefficient; females as percentage of economically active population; 
median age; the proportion of the largest ethnic/linguistic group as a proxy for the 
degree of ethnic fragmentation; the Social Globalisation Index published by KOF as a 
proxy of a country’s integration to global cultural interaction; religion dummies, taking 
the value of unity if more than fifty percent of the population belongs to a specific 
religious creed; and longitude, latitude (absolute distance from the Equator) and their 
interaction as proxies for unobserved social/cultural factors.  
Table 1 presents correlation coefficients of all possible determinants of 
corruption against the two measures of corruption. A high TI-CPI and WB-CCI score 
denotes a lower level of corruption therefore corruption is negatively correlated with 
positive-signed variables and negatively associated with positive-signed ones. 
Consistent with previous studies, TI-CPI and WB-CCI are almost perfectly correlated. 
The statistics reported for GCCs include reasonably sizeable negative values for average 
sunlight, temperature and maximum elevation point and positive ones for average 
number of wet days. The set of economic variables includes, unsurprisingly, a high 
positive score for per capita GDP and an equally high negative score for the easy of 
doing business index. Scores of moderate size are reported for government share in 
GDP (negative) and education expenditure (positive). For political variables, we obtain 
a strikingly high positive coefficient for the proportion of internet users in total 
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population, indeed the highest score (0.87) among the full set of variables. This is 
closely followed by significant positive scores for the political rights index (our proxy 
for the level of democracy) and a highly negative score for restrictions on press. A 
moderate positive coefficient is reported for common law while among colonial 
dummies the most sizeable score is the negative coefficient referring to ex-
Soviet/communist countries. Finally, among social/cultural variables we obtain a very 
high positive score for the social globalisation index, followed by sizeable positive 
scores for median age and urbanisation. Moderately sizeable coefficients are also 
reported for female participation in labour force (positive) and two religious dummies.  
 
4.2. Empirical findings  
4.2.1. Benchmark models  
Following the existing empirical literature on the determinants of corruption we 
adopt a specific-to-general econometric approach. We start by estimating a model 
conditioning corruption on GCC variables and build upward adding, in separate 
estimation rounds, per-capita GDP, other economic variables, political variables and 
social/cultural determinants of corruption. We first estimate an OLS model explaining 
the TI-CPI score on GCCs only. The results are presented in Table (2), column (a). 
Statistically significant variables include temperature (with a negative sign), non-
cultivatable land (positive sign), coastline length (positive sign), maximum elevation 
point (negative sign) and number of days below freezing point (negative sign). Next, we 
re-estimate the model controlling for per capita GDP. The results are reported in Table 
(2), column (b). As expected, GDP per head is highly significant with a positive sign. 
Temperature, coastline and days below zero remain significant. Maximum elevation 
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point becomes insignificant, replaced by precipitation which enters the model with a 
positive sign.  
We then add the remaining economic variables, including education 
expenditure, as percent in GDP.  From this point onwards, and in order to save space, 
we only report the findings of the estimated parsimonious models (all the intermediate 
results are available upon request).
12
 The results are reported in Table 2, column (c). 
Temperature, precipitation, days below zero and coastline length are all statistically 
significant. Despite their individual insignificance, non-cultivatable land and water 
bodies are also jointly significant and hence maintained. As far as economic variables 
are concerned, in addition to GDP significant variables are the Ease of Doing Business 
Index (negative sign), natural gas reserves (negative sign) and education spending 
(positive sign). Next we introduce political variables. The results are reported in Table 
2, column (d). We obtain three new significant variables. First, the Political Rights 
Index measuring democratic freedoms. Consistent with previous findings in the 
literature, this enters the model in its second and third power, with negative and positive 
sign respectively. Second two colonial dummies, namely ex-British colonies with a 
positive sign and ex-Soviet republics/communist states with a negative sign. Third, the 
percentage of internet users in total population. Last we add cultural/social variables. 
The estimated parsimonious model is reported in Table 2, column (e). This represents 
our final and preferred specification. From this last set of variables only mean age and 
the interaction of longitude with the absolute value of latitude are significant, with a 
positive and negative sign respectively. The remaining variables remain unaffected.  
 
                                                 
12
 The parsimonious model is obtained using a general-to-specific approach: Starting from a model 
including all variables, we exclude the least significant variable and re-estimate the model. We continue 
to exclude individual insignificant variables until we are left with a set of variables that are either 
significant on their own, or jointly as a group. 
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4.2.2. Robustness tests  
We test the robustness of our empirical findings in a number of ways. First, we 
added back, on a one-by-one basis, all variables excluded in previous estimation rounds. 
In all cases the final parsimonious specification reported in Table (2), column (e) did 
not change (results available upon request). Second, we repeated our OLS estimations 
using as dependant variable the three-year average of the Control for Corruption Index 
published by the World Bank (WB-CCI) for years 2006, 2007 and 2008. The results of 
the final parsimonious model are reported in Table 3, column (a).
13
 These are almost 
identical to those obtained using the TI-CPI, the only exception being that natural gas 
resources are now marginally insignificant.
14
 Third, we use a two-stage least squares 
modelling approach, where in the first stage we instrument per capita GDP using GCC 
variables and geographical co-ordinates.
15
 The results of the final parsimonious 
specifications modelling the TI-CPI and WB-CCI are presented in Table 3, columns (b) 
and (c) respectively. With minor differences, these are very similar to those obtained 
using OLS. Although temperature and GDP appear statistically significant at the 10% 
level only, in both equations they are jointly significant at the six percent level. Note 
also that the two-stage equation modelling the TI-CPI replaces natural gas reserves with 
oil reserves. Although this variable is marginally insignificant at the 10% level, it is 
jointly significant with temperature and GDP at the 5% level. For the two-stage LS 
equation modelling the WB-CPI neither natural gas nor oil reserves were close to being 
significant at the 10% level, hence they are excluded.  
                                                 
13
 The results of all intermediate estimations are available upon request.  
14
 The difference in the size of the reported coefficients compared to the equations modelling the TI-CPI 
is explained by the difference in the units of measurement. The TI-CPI classifies countries using an index 
taking values between 1 and 10. The WB-CCI takes values between -2.5 and 2.5. In both cases, a higher 
score denotes less corruption.  
15
 The exact set of instruments in the equation modelling GDP are longitude, the interaction of longitude 
with absolute latitude (distance from the Equator), non-cultivatable land, coastline and maximum 
elevation point.  
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Finally, we use weighted least squares (WLS) to estimate models where the 
dependent variable is the WB-CCI reported for year 2008 and weights are the inverse of 
the reported scores’ standard deviation.
16
 This estimation methodology has the 
advantage of placing higher emphasis on the more reliable, lower-variance observations 
as opposed to the less reliable, higher-variance ones. The results are reported in Table 3, 
column (d). Compared to our final OLS specification reported in Table 2, column (e), 
the WLS findings remain qualitatively unchanged.  
 
4.2.3. Discussion  
Our main empirical finding is that GCCs in the form of average temperature, 
precipitation and non-cultivatable land are significant in explaining corruption, even 
after controlling for all other possible determinants of corruption suggested by previous 
literature. Corruption increases with cultivatable land, which is consistent with the 
predictions of our theoretical model in section 3. Corruption also increases with 
temperature and declines with precipitation. These findings are also consistent with the 
intuition underlying our theoretical background: Benign temperatures enhance the 
chances of human survival while high precipitation, particularly under low 
temperatures, poses challenges increasing incentives for co-operation.
17
  
Regarding other determinants of corruption, our findings are consistent with 
those reported by previous studies. We find corruption to decline with per-capita 
income and to increase with the rent-seeking opportunities created by 
bureaucracy/excessive regulation and natural resources. The link between corruption 
                                                 
16
 We could not estimate WLS models using the TI-CPI as dependent variable, as the Transparency 
International website does not report standard deviations for the reported values of the TI-CPI index.  
17
 It might be plausibly argued that high precipitation under benign temperatures increases land fertility 
thus providing lower incentives for co-operation increasing individualism and corruption. This effect is 
captured in our model by the proportion of non-cultivatable land which can be seen as capturing the 
interaction between temperature and precipitation in each of our sample countries.  
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and democratic freedoms is confirmed to be non-linear, suggesting that for corruption to 
decline a critical threshold of freedoms has to be reached. Furthermore, corruption is 
lower in countries with a British colonial past and increases in countries with a 
Soviet/communist political legacy. Last, but not least, we provide a new, previously 
unreported, empirical finding, according to which corruption declines with the 
percentage of internet users to a country’s total population. This finding may be 
interpreted as capturing the beneficial interaction of three variables reducing corruption, 
namely economic development, human capital/education and access to independent 
news. This explains the absence of education and the freedom of press index from our 
final specifications and renders our findings consistent with those of previous studies.  
Finally, an interesting aspect of our empirical findings is the lack of 
social/cultural variables from our final specifications, with the exception of mean age. 
Given the unambiguous exogeneity of GCCs to any other potential determinant of 
corruption, this raises the prospect of an intriguing possibility, namely that cultural 
norms themselves are heavily influenced on GCCs. If this is the case indeed, previous 
studies explaining corruption on social/cultural variables are not necessarily picking up 
a structural effect of those variables on corruption but, indirectly, the effect of GCCs 
through variables that are ultimately endogenous to climate. This is consistent with the 
predictions of our theoretical analysis in section 2, where unfavourable GCCs increase 
the pay-off schedules of co-operative strategies, reflected in social variables, relative to 
individualistic strategies. Higher pay-offs provided by co-operative strategies under 
unfavourable GCCs provide rational agents incentives to develop social organisations 
yielding positive externalities benefiting rational, self-rewarding individuals. This is 
reflected, for example, in higher urbanisation and female participation in production as 
well as the development of trust technologies expressed in fair-play values, labour 
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division based on individual’s comparative advantage (a pre-requisite of meritocracy), 
mutual-trust and law-abiding behaviour, all of which are associated with less corruption. 
Furthermore, higher individual rewards offered by co-operative strategies under 
unfavourable GCCs increase the credibility of individuals’ commitment to them. 
Increased credibility reinforces in turn the culture of mutual trust among agents, thus 
facilitating the perpetuation of co-operative strategies. 
 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS  
This paper presents a new explanation of corruption based on geography and 
climate conditions (GCCs). We define corruption as an extreme form of individualism, 
defined as actions of self-rewarding agents aiming exclusively towards improvement of 
their personal welfare. Individualism is socially acceptable as long as self-improvement 
is pursued through means complying with generally accepted fairness norms, the 
existence of which has been established by previous literature. In our analysis meeting 
the common fairness norms requires a minimum of civic engagement, reflected by the 
share of one’s personal resources dedicated to wholly or partially collective, as opposed 
to exclusively self-rewarding, objectives. Corruption is defined as a state where the 
degree of one’s individualism exceeds a critical threshold up to which individualism is 
generally regarded to be legitimate. Each person’s degree of individualism is a random 
variable following a certain (e.g. normal) probability distribution. We assume that this 
distribution’s mean is always below corruption’s threshold, i.e. the representative agent 
acts fairly in all societies. The average level of individualism, however, may vary across 
societies. A society with a relatively high average level of individualism will exhibit a 
higher frequency of extreme individualism, compared to a society with a relatively low 
average value of individualism. In that case, the factors explaining corruption will be 
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the factors determining the mean of the distribution of individualism. The central point 
of our paper is that this mean is originally determined by exogenous GCCs.  
To show this, we use a simple model where the representative agent derives 
utility from consumption and leisure. The agent operates under a survival constraint 
imposing a minimum level of consumption. To meet this survival constraint the agent 
can either work individually or in co-operation with another agent. The productivity of 
individual labour is exogenous, determined by stochastic GCCs. Co-operative work 
increases labour productivity beyond the level determined by GCCs due to synergies in 
joint work. From that point of view, the agent has an incentive to work co-operatively. 
On the other hand, the disutility of co-operative labour is higher than that of individual 
labour, due to co-ordination costs present in joint work. Hence, the agent has an 
incentive to work individually. As favourable GCCs increase the productivity of 
individual labour, agents can meet the survival constraint easier under favourable rather 
than unfavourable GCCs. Therefore, more favourable GCCs provide incentives for 
more individual work, resulting in a higher level of average individualism. This causes a 
higher frequency of extreme individualism i.e. higher corruption. GCCs be seen to 
determine an initial equilibrium whose present-day legacy can be tested controlling for 
other possible corruption causes. 
We test the empirical validity of our model using data from a cross-section of 
115 countries. Controlling for all other determinants of corruption suggested in previous 
literature we confirm the model’s main predictions: We find that corruption increases 
with temperature and declines with precipitation and the share of non-cultivatable land 
in a country’s total area. We also find that corruption declines with per capita GDP and 
genuine, as opposed to “half-hearted”, democracy; and increases with natural resources 
and bureaucracy/regulation. British colonial heritage reduces corruption whereas a 
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communist past increases it. A country’s median inhabitant’s age has a negative effect 
on corruption. Finally, we find that corruption declines with the ratio of internet users to 
a country’s population. This new finding, not reported in previous literature, is 
interpreted as capturing the beneficial interaction of economic development, human 
capital/education and access to independent news.  
At first sight our empirical findings may be seen as conveying pessimistic 
implications: If stochastic GCC determine an initial equilibrium involving a high level 
of corruption society may subsequently adapt to it thus reinforcing and perpetuating it. 
Yet, the international experience presented in this paper clearly demonstrates that this 
need not be so. Countries with GCCs rendering them naturally prone to high levels of 
corruption may tackle corruption successfully if they develop effective institutions 
providing credible rewards for agents adopting fair behaviours and sanctions for agents 
adopting corrupt ones. To achieve this objective two conditions are imperative: 
transparency and belief in the rule of law. These in turn require, as confirmed by our 
empirical findings, a high level of individual political freedoms, freedom of information 
and advanced systems of education and legal administration. All these variables, as well 
as economic development, are endogenous to public choices reflected in government 
policy and quality of state institutions. Hence the implications of our findings are 
mainly optimistic: As long as there is a will to do so, corruption can be substantially 
reduced, even within environments where natural conditions and past practices have 
deeply entrenched it.  
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Table 1: Correlation coefficient against indexes of perceived corruption  
 
   
 TI – CPI WB – CCI 
   
   
Transparency International CPI 1.00 0.99 
World Bank CCI  0.99 1.00 
   
Climate variables    
Sunlight  -0.34 -0.32 
Temperature  -0.35 -0.34 
Precipitation  0.07 0.03 
Wet days  0.37 0.36 
Days below 0 C  0.21 0.20 
   
Geography variables    
Coastline  0.20 0.19 
Maximum elevation point  -0.34 -0.34 
Total area  0.00 -0.01 
Inland water bodies  (% in total area)  0.13 0.11 
Non-cultivatable land  (% in total area)  0.07 0.08 
   
Economic variables    
Per capita GDP  0.76 0.78 
Government share in GDP  -0.37 -0.36 
Economic openness  0.22 0.21 
Ease of Doing Business  
(higher values = more bureaucracy)  
 
-0.74 
 
-0.74 
Oil reserves -0.06 -0.04 
Natural gas reserves  -0.13 -0.11 
   
Education expenditure  (% in GDP) 0.34 0.37 
   
 
Notes: The values of a country’s climate variables are approximated by the values in the country’s capital 
city reported by the BBC weather site. For some countries BBC weather does not report climate 
conditions for the capital city, in which case we use the values reported for the country’s largest city. 
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Table 1 (cont’d): Correlation coefficient against indexes of perceived corruption  
 
   
 TI – CPI WB – CCI 
   
   
Political variables    
Political Rights Index  0.63 0.64 
Uninterrupted democracy 0.66 0.65 
Freedom of Press  
(higher values = more restrictions)  
 
-0.72 
 
-0.72 
Internet users  (% of total population)  0.87 0.86 
Political globalization index  0.42 0.42 
Federal state  0.08 0.08 
Total population  -0.09 -0.10 
Common law 0.31 0.31 
British colony  0.18 0.18 
French colony  -0.23 -0.24 
Ottoman province  -0.19 -0.18 
Soviet Republic or communist state  -0.29 -0.30 
Austrian-Hungarian province -0.01 -0.01 
Spanish colony  -0.17 -0.17 
Portuguese colony  0.02 0.04 
Dutch colony  -0.01 0.00 
USA-administered  0.05 0.03 
   
Social variables    
Urbanisation  0.59 0.60 
Income inequality (Gini coefficient) -.0.37 -0.38 
Females as % in economically active 
population  
0.32 0.31 
Median age  0.67 0.68 
Ethnic fragmentation  
(higher values = higher homogeneity)  
 
0.11 
 
0.09 
Social globalisation index  0.82 0.83 
Protestant  0.39 0.40 
Catholic  0.02 0.03 
Orthodox  -0.17 -0.16 
Judaism  0.06 0.06 
Muslim  -0.35 -0.34 
Hindu  -0.09 -0.09 
Eastern Asia religions  -0.10 -0.12 
Longitude  0.21 0.21 
Latitude (distance from Equator, klms)  -0.17 -0.21 
Interaction  of longitude/latitude  -0.19 -0.21 
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